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REACHING TOO FAR? 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
REGARDING THE SCOPE OF ARBITRATION 
CLAUSES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS 
Daniel T. Lloyd* 
This Comment examines side agreements of collective bargaining 
agreements (“CBAs”), specifically the extent to which a CBA’s arbitration 
clause can be applied to a seemingly related side agreement.  There is 
somewhat of a universal agreement that in certain circumstances it is 
appropriate to apply the terms of a CBA’s arbitration clause to a related 
side agreement.  It is unclear, however, what courts should use as the 
requisite threshold test for determining applicability.  This Comment 
analyzes the current circuit split over the appropriate standard to utilize 
when determining the applicability of a CBA’s arbitration clause to a side 
agreement. 
 INTRODUCTION 
As the United States’ national economy has expanded, so have the 
complexity and sophistication of labor negotiations and labor agreements.  
Workers yearning for the many potential benefits to be gained by collective 
bargaining often enter into elaborate agreements with their employers.1  In 
the modern era, CBAs have become commonplace in American labor law.2  
Despite many legal opinions and cases discussing CBAs, a lesser-known 
area of controversy is the law regarding side agreements to CBAs.  The 
process of crafting an agreement that is satisfactory to all parties involved 
in complex labor negotiations is extremely difficult, and as a result, 
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 1. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (describing how the 
proliferation of collective bargaining agreements has been, in part, spurred by an increase in 
the complexity of employment relationships). 
 2. See id. 
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employers and labor unions often enter into side agreements for any 
number of reasons.3  Side agreements allow both labor unions and 
employers to modify their existing relationship and to concurrently avoid 
the risk of opening up the existing CBA for negotiation on other unrelated 
issues.4 
Disagreements and litigation have always coexisted with CBAs and 
related side agreements.  Modern labor policy emphasizes that the preferred 
forum for disputed CBAs is arbitration, rather than typical court 
proceedings.5  As a result, arbitration clauses have become a mainstay in 
most modern CBAs.6  Side agreements, which are often far less complex 
than the CBAs they are related to, do not always explicitly contain a 
separate arbitration clause.7  While a cursory evaluation would seem to 
indicate that an agreement without an arbitration clause cannot be subject 
to mandatory arbitration, in certain circumstances courts have held that 
related side agreements can be subject to the CBA’s arbitration clause.  
These holdings are grounded in the strong policy preference for arbitration 
and the inter-related nature of CBAs and side agreements.8 
Most courts agree that there are circumstances in which a side 
agreement to a CBA can be subject to the terms of the CBA’s arbitration 
clause.  However, there is currently a split between the circuits over the test 
that should be applied to determine when an arbitration clause should be 
held applicable.  The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits consider a 
side agreement to be a part of the CBA.9  After establishing that a side 
agreement is part of the CBA, these courts then determine whether the side 
agreement would have fallen within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration 
clause.10  Alternatively, the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits consider 
the relatedness of the side agreement to the CBA when reviewing whether 
 3. Certain past cases involve a employer and a union entering into a new side 
agreement, rather than revising the original CBA.  See United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007); United Steelworkers v. Duluth 
Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005); Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 
279 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 4. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 274; Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 787; Dutra Group, 
279 F.3d at 1077. 
 5. See Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566 (emphasizing the preference of modern courts 
for labor disputes to be handled by arbitrators). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d 271; Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786; Dutra Group, 
279 F.3d 1075. 
 8. See Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 274; Dutra Group, 279 F.3d at 1077; Duluth Clinic, 
Ltd., 413 F.3d at 787. 
 9. See generally Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 
F.3d at 1080; Niro v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987); L.O. Koven & 
Bro., Inc. v. Local Union 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 10. See Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 279; Dutra Group, 279 F.3d at 1080. 
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an arbitration clause of a CBA should be applied to a side agreement.11  
Side agreements deemed collateral are not subject to the terms of the 
CBA’s arbitration clause, while those not deemed collateral are subject to 
the CBA’s arbitration clause.12 
This Comment will analyze the circuit split over which standard is 
appropriate to utilize when determining the applicability of a CBA’s 
arbitration clause to a related side agreement.  In doing so, I will analyze 
each of the seven primary cases that serve as the framework for this 
disagreement.  Applying the reasoning of United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., I argue that the scope test is preferable to the 
collateral test because the former is more stable.13  While conceivably more 
technically correct, the collateral test marginalizes the stability and 
predictability that is an essential component of the American legal 
tradition. 
Part I of this Comment examines the historical background of CBAs 
with a focus on the case law and legislative history that provide the 
framework for the debate over side agreements to CBAs.  Part II focuses on 
the seven cases comprising the circuit split over the applicability of a 
CBA’s arbitration clause to a related side agreement.  Part II also details 
and emphasizes the circuits’ reasoning for reaching their differing 
conclusions.  In Part III, this Comment examines the potential ramifications 
of this split, along with the possibility of a Supreme Court resolution of this 
split.  Finally, this Comment will emphasize the superiority of the scope 
test over the collateral test. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ARBITRATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS 
In 1935, Congress took one of its most important steps toward the 
regulation of the organized labor market.  The National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) was Congress’ first attempt at managing labor relations.14  
After twelve years of regulation under the NLRA, Congress amended it to 
include the National Labor Management Relations Act (NLMRA).15  One 
 11. See Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 788-89; Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, 
United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 12. See Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 789; Cornell Univ., 942 F.2d at 140; Adkins, 
771 F.2d at 831-32.  
 13. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278-79 (discussing the scope test as applied by the Third, 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits). 
 14. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2002)). 
 15. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000)). 
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of the NLMRA’s primary purposes was to change the way that labor suits 
would be brought.16  Section 301 of the NLMRA created automatic federal 
standing for parties claiming breach of a CBA.17  As a result, federal 
district courts became the courts of original jurisdiction for many labor 
claims.18 
For the next thirteen years, the federal courts resolved the majority of 
labor disputes.  However, this structure changed with the “Steelworkers 
Trilogy,” a series of cases decided in 1960 that had a dramatic effect on 
federal labor law.19  The Steelworkers Trilogy paved the way for arbitration 
to become the primary form of resolution for collective bargaining 
disputes.20  In United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,21 the 
Supreme Court declared that the federal courts should grant strong 
deference to arbitration.  Accordingly, the Court held that as long as the 
arbitration is reasonable, the federal courts should defer to arbitrators’ 
judgments in collective bargaining disputes.22  In United Steelworkers of 
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation,23 which was decided in the same 
year, the Court strongly argued in favor of an increased use of arbitration as 
a means to promote industrial peace and stability.  In doing so, the Court in 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation noted that while arbitration is not a substitute 
for litigation, the increased use of arbitration in collective bargaining 
disputes would be beneficial to the national labor market.24  While holding 
that federal courts should not force arbitration upon unwilling parties, the 
Court created a strong presumption in favor of arbitration for collective 
bargaining disputes.25  Since these decisions, the Supreme Court has 
frequently emphasized its preference for and its deference to arbitrations.26 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Currently, the circuits of the United States Court of Appeals are 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigating Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 20. Am. Mfg. Corp., 363 U.S. 564; Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 574; Enter. 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 593. 
 21. 363 U.S. at 596-97 (1960) (discussing the benefits provided by an arbitrator). 
 22. Id. at 593. 
 23. 363 U.S. at 578. 
 24. Id. at 578-80. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 
531 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (affirming the Court’s prior holdings on the arbitration of labor 
disputes); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 647-51 (1986). 
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almost evenly split over the question of when to apply the arbitration clause 
of a CBA to a related side agreement.  The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth circuits have adopted the “Scope Test.”27  Conversely, the Second, 
Fourth, and Eighth circuits apply the “Collateral Test.”28 
A.  The Scope Test 
In the four cases that provide the framework for the scope test, labor 
unions brought suit against their employers to seek arbitration to help 
resolve their disputes.29  In all four circuits, the courts involved held that 
the scope test was the proper test to determine when to apply a CBA’s 
arbitration clause to a related side agreement.30 
The courts articulated a two-step process.  In the first step, the courts 
interpret the related side agreement as if it was part of the original CBA.31  
The courts attempt to create a hypothetical agreement that contains both the 
related side agreement and the CBA, along with the CBA’s arbitration 
clause.32  In the second step, the courts examine this new agreement, 
focusing on the new terms provided by the side agreement in light of the 
arbitration clause.33  If the terms of the arbitration clause would cause the 
side agreement’s provisions to be arbitrated, then courts will decide in 
favor of arbitration.34  Conversely, if the terms of the arbitration clause 
would dictate that the provisions of the side agreement are not subject to 
arbitration, then the courts will find against extending the CBA’s 
arbitration clause to the related side agreement.35 
 27. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 
278 (6th Cir. 2007); Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1080 
(9th Cir. 2002); Niro v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987); L.O. Koven & 
Bro., Inc. v. Local Union 5767, United Steelworkers, 381 F.2d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 28. See United Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 788-89 (8th Cir. 2005); 
Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 
942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th 
Cir. 1985). 
 29. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d 271; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d 1075; Niro, 
827 F.2d 173; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d 196. 
 30. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080; 
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201. 
 31. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080; 
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201. 
 32. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080; 
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201. 
 33. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080; 
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201. 
 34. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080; 
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201. 
 35. Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 278; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac., 279 F.3d at 1080; 
Niro, 827 F.2d at 175; L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 201. 
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1.  The Third Circuit 
The issue of the applicability of the arbitration clause of a CBA to a 
related side agreement was first examined in L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc. v. 
Local Union 5767, United Steelworkers.36  In Koven, the steelworkers’ 
union argued for arbitration of a claim related to vacation pay.37  While the 
United States District Court of New Jersey initially held in favor of the 
employer and against arbitration, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed, finding in favor of the union and constructing what eventually 
became the modern day scope test.38  In 1964, the union and Koven 
settled.39  This settlement agreement became the side agreement at issue in 
this case.40  While the main CBA contained an arbitration clause, the 
settlement agreement did not.41  Following the settlement, a dispute arose 
regarding whether Koven was correctly tabulating its employees’ vacation 
time.42  Part of this dispute related directly to terms featured exclusively in 
the settlement agreement.43  The union argued that the settlement 
agreement should be arbitrated in the same manner as the claims under the 
CBA; Koven, on the other hand, argued that the settlement agreement 
should not be subject to the arbitration clause.44 
At the outset, the Third Circuit noted that there was only a small 
amount of settled law in this area.45  While one may predict that a lack of 
jurisprudence in this area would cause courts to devote considerable time 
and analysis to its decision, the exact opposite occurred in Koven.  The 
Court held that “unless a release explicitly discharges the parties from the 
collective bargaining agreement itself . . . its effect should be determined 
by an arbitral forum.”46  Instead of devoting time to determining the proper 
standard to utilize, the Court, in little more than a sentence, elected to use 
the scope test.47 
The Third Circuit provided little justification for its position and 
explained in a single paragraph the creation of the scope test, the reason for 
it being the proper standard for the instant case, and its application to the 
 36. 381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 37. Id. at 199. 
 38. Id. at 205. 
 39. Id. at 198. 
 40. Id. at 199. 
 41. Id. 
 42. L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 199. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 200. 
 45. Id. at 204. 
 46. Id. at 205. 
 47. Id. 
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facts at hand.48  The Court’s main justification for creating the scope test 
was that it wanted to let arbitrators handle as many issues as possible due to 
the arbitrator’s expertise.49  The Court labeled arbitrators as being “expertly 
atuned [sic]” to the types of issues in contention.50  Because of this alleged 
expertise, the Court held that all of the issues that are not explicitly out of 
the scope of the arbitration clause should be subject to arbitration, 
including issues raised in related side agreements.51 
2.  The Seventh Circuit 
The next case addressing this issue, Niro v. Fearn Int’l,52 was decided 
in 1987, two years after the Fourth Circuit decided in Adkins v. Time World 
Co. to utilize the collateral test instead of the scope test.53  In Niro, the 
Seventh Circuit dealt with a dispute arising from a claim related to a 
wrongful termination.54  After losing at the district court level, Niro’s 
former employer appealed and argued that since the source of the wrongful 
termination was a related side agreement and not the CBA itself, the CBA’s 
arbitration clause should not apply.55  The Seventh Circuit disagreed and 
affirmed the decision of the district court, and, consequently, ensconced the 
scope test as part of its precedent.56 
Dominic Niro was an employee for Fearn International, Inc. and a 
member of Local 744 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.57  In 
1984, Fearn fired Niro, who had a history of drug and alcohol use, under 
the terms of the existing CBA.58  After his termination, Fearn, the union, 
and Niro reached a settlement agreement that allowed Niro to return to 
work.59  After creating this agreement, Fearn again terminated Niro.60  On 
this occasion, Fearn fired Niro under the auspices of the settlement 
agreement, not the CBA.61  Niro attempted to seek arbitration under the 
CBA for his second termination, but Fearn argued that the CBA’s 
arbitration clause should not be applied to the related side agreement.62 
 48. L.O. Koven & Bro., Inc., 381 F.2d at 204-05.  
 49. Id. at 205. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 204. 
 52. Niro v. Fearn Int’l, Inc., 827 F.2d 173, 175 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 53. Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 54. Niro, 827 F.2d at 174. 
 55. Id. at 174. 
 56. Id. at 176. 
 57. Id. at 174. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Niro, 827 F.2d at 174. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit’s analysis clearly mirrors the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning.  Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., the Seventh Circuit asserted that there were strong policy 
reasons supporting the use of arbitration in these types of disputes.63  
However, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis was more in depth than the Third 
Circuit’s analysis, partially because there was a much greater volume of 
case law to rely upon.64  Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that the scope 
test was the appropriate standard and that because Niro’s second 
termination was within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration clause, it should 
be subject to arbitration.65 
The Seventh Circuit’s justification for utilizing the scope test is based 
on a two-prong approach.  The Court’s first justification is a reiteration of 
the Third Circuit’s justification in Koven.  Although the Seventh Circuit did 
not explicitly say that arbitrators were better equipped to handle these types 
of issues, the Court frequently cited the existence of strong policy reasons 
favoring arbitration.66  Even though the Court did not detail the policy 
reasons, the expertise of arbitrators discussed in Koven would likely be 
among the reasons to adopt the scope test. 
The Court’s second justification for utilizing the scope test was its 
desire to respect the wishes of the contracting parties.  The Court posited 
that while a party could not be subject to arbitration against its will, the 
inclusion of an arbitration clause places the onus on the contracting parties 
to show why a dispute should not be covered by it.67  Specifically, the 
Court, citing Warrior, looked for specific enunciations of the areas to be 
covered and the areas not to be considered under the arbitration clause.68  
In the absence of one or both of these instances, the Court held that there 
was a strong preference for disputed issues to be arbitrate 69
3.  The Ninth Circuit 
In Inlandboatmens Union of the Pac. v. Dutra Group,70 the Ninth 
Circuit delivered a thorough and compelling discussion on the issue of the 
applicability of the arbitration clause of a CBA on a related side agreement.  
Unlike some of the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit in Dutra acknowledged 
the existence of relevant, yet conflicting, precedents.71  Of all of the cases 
 63. Id. at 175. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 176. 
 66. Niro, 827 F.2d at 175. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 71. Id. at 1079-80. 
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in this area, Dutra provides the most comprehensive analysis of the issue, 
with the Court ultimately choosing the scope test.72 
The Inlandboatmens Union (IBU) represents deckhands in the San 
Francisco Bay Area.73  In November 1997, the IBU filed a grievance 
alleging that Dutra violated their subcontracting agreement with the union 
when they hired non-union workers to provide service for a boat Dutra 
rented from the IBU.74  The CBA between Dutra and the IBU stated that 
Dutra would only hire IBU-represented personnel.75  Dutra settled the 
dispute with the IBU through a five-element settlement agreement.76  
While the settlement forbade Dutra from hiring non-IBU laborers in the 
future, they soon reneged on this part of the settlem 77
Citing Warrior, the Ninth Circuit artfully opined that a CBA is not 
meant to be construed in the same manner as a normal contract.78  The 
Court stated that CBA’s are meant to be “generalized code[s]”79 designed 
to “govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly 
anticipate.”80 
In this case, the Ninth Circuit addressed a major concern with the 
breadth of arbitration clauses.  With Warrior in mind, the Court indicated 
that the breadth of the arbitration clause is one of, if not the most, 
determinative factor for the Court to review.81  If the arbitration clause is 
sufficiently broad, the Ninth Circuit inferred that the parties intended to 
include any agreement that could potentially fall within its scope.82  
Likewise, the Court envisioned a spectrum where narrowly tailored 
arbitration clauses would result in fewer arbitrations, while broad clauses 
would yield frequent arbitrations. 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is helpful because it thoroughly examines 
the contrasting viewpoints on the applicability of a CBA’s arbitration 
clause to related side agreements.  The Court rejected the collateral test and 
argued that Supreme Court precedent, namely Warrior and the 
Steelworkers Trilogy, requires the scope test.83  Regardless of precedent, 
the Court (1) argues that stability dictates choosing the scope test over the 
 72. Id. at 1080. 
 73. Id. at 1077. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 279 F.3d at 1075. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1079. 
 79. Id. (citing Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578-80). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1080. 
 82. 279 F.3d at 1080-81. 
 83. Id. 
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collateral test;84 and (2) finds that the collateral test was inherently unstable 
because the goal of labor law is, and should remain, industrial peace and 
stability.85  Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that it had no choice but to adopt 
the scope test.86 
4.  The Sixth Circuit 
The most recent case to address this issue, United Steelworkers of 
America v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co.,87 employs the scope test, which is 
preferred by the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits.  Decided in 2007, 
Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. echoes the language and reasoning of the 
Ninth Circuit’s 2001 Dutra opinion.88  The Sixth Circuit, relying heavily 
on the precedent of Warrior, adopts the scope test analysis.89
Cooper Tire and Rubber is a rubber and tire manufacturer with major 
operation plants in Ohio.90  Since 1941, Cooper and the United 
Steelworkers of America entered into a series of CBAs dealing with issues 
such as wages and benefits.91  The CBA in question had a broad arbitration 
clause stating that “[a]ny grievance or dispute which remains unsettled 
after following the Grievance Procedure outlined above may be appealed to 
arbitration by the party desiring arbitration.”92 
Since 1991, Cooper had, as a part of its employee pension program, 
sent out letters detailing the company’s annual contribution to retiree 
healthcare benefits.93  However, these letters did not contain any language 
relating to arbitration or other grievance procedures.94  Between 2000 and 
2003, Cooper Tire and Rubber attempted to adjust the caps placed on the 
benefits paid to retired workers.95  In 2004, the union sued Cooper Tire and 
Rubber to compel arbitration over this issue, arguing that the terms of the 
letters fell under the coverage of the CBA’s arbitration clause.96 
Using nearly identical language to the Ninth Circuit in Dutra,97 the 
Sixth Circuit pointed to Warrior’s holding that a CBA was “more than a 
 84. Id. at 1081. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 278, 279 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 88. Id. at 279-81. 
 89. Id. at 279. 
 90. Id. at 273. 
 91. Id. 273-75. 
 92. Id. at 274. 
 93. 474 F.3d at 274. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 275-76. 
 97. Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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contract”98 and should be construed to be a “generalized code to govern a 
myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.”99  Similar 
to Dutra, the Sixth Circuit rationalized that one of the primary motivating 
factors of labor law should be industrial peace and stability, a goal that the 
collateral test did not further.100  The Sixth Circuit added that the 
ramifications of the scope test were more easily anticipated by the 
contracting parties, as parties can more easily determine the breadth of their 
arbitration clauses.101 
5.  Analysis of the Scope Test 
To the average person, the scope test appears to be the more favorable 
of the two current alternatives.  The scope test provides an ease of use not 
commonly found in complex labor negotiations.  Given its usability, there 
is a strong argument to be made for the scope test’s ability to provide 
greater stability in labor disputes.  However, the scope test presents a 
potentially major problem:  circumvention.  While possibly flawed, the 
scope test is a strong contender against the more elaborate collateral test. 
One of the major benefits of the scope test is that it is much easier to 
apply than the collateral test.  Whereas the collateral test examines many 
competing factors,102 the scope test only analyzes the CBA’s arbitration 
clause.  As is evident in some of the above case law, one could create a 
continuum ranging from the most comprehensive to the least 
comprehensive arbitration clauses, as in Dutra.103  For particularly broad 
arbitration clauses, the presumption will be in favor of arbitration of the 
side agreement in contention.  Conversely, for extremely restrictive 
arbitration clauses, there will be a presumption against extending the 
arbitration clause to cover related side agreements. 
The scope test could also be considered superior because it better 
promotes stability and predictability.  This was the primary motivation 
behind its adoption by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.  The notion that the 
scope test is more predictable stems from its ease of application.  In theory, 
parties should be able to examine their own CBA, analyze its breadth, and 
then easily determine if a side agreement will fall under it.  The courts that 
are in favor of the scope test seem to create a “buyer-beware” situation.  In 
other words, parties that opt to create ultra-inclusive arbitration clauses 
 98. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 
2007) (quoting Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582). 
 99. Id. at 278 n.8 (citing Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578-89). 
 100. Id. at 280. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See infra Part II.B.1. (providing a deeper analysis of the collateral test). 
 103. 279 F. 3d. at 1080. 
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designed to cover almost any type of dispute that could arise out of the 
agreement will be have to face the consequences of arbitrating every 
dispute, even if it arises out of a side agreement and not the CBA. 
However, the scope test does have two potential drawbacks.  First, it 
places a heavy burden on parties to exercise foresight.  With the scope test, 
courts envision parties crafting a CBA and anticipating these side 
agreements.  The paradox is that the main reason many side agreements 
come into existence is because they often address factors that could not be 
foreseen during the CBA’s creation. 
The second major drawback of the scope test is that it potentially 
circumvents the parties’ intent, a major criticism by the collateral test’s 
advocates.104  The conflict between the scope and collateral tests is 
emblematic of a much larger conflict in the law:  the conflict between 
textualism and intentionalism.  A textualist would favor the scope test, 
while an intentionalist would favor the collateral test.105  Some would fault 
the scope test for not taking into account the intent of the parties and 
deciding solely based on the plain meaning of the arbitration clause.  This 
and other arguments frequently lodged against textualism can be used 
against the scope test as well.  An argument can be made that the central 
holding in Warrior is an unfair circumvention of the parties’ potential 
intent, as parties may not intend for a CBA to be used as the code by which 
to judge areas that are not explicitly mentioned in the CBA. 
Despite its drawbacks, the scope test is certainly an effective way to 
handle side agreements.  While not perfect, it provides a simple mechanism 
that provides parties some level of certainty regarding whether or not a 
court will be willing to extend an arbitration clause to apply to a side 
agreement.  Overall, both textualists and courts advocate the scope test 
because of its simplicity and ease.106 
 104. See United Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(ignoring certain phrases and formatting choices in the CBA that suggest that the arbitrator 
has the power to interpret the CBA). 
 105. Textualists argue that the best meaning of language is the plain meaning, while 
intentionalists argue that the meaning of language should be derived from the intent of the 
creators of the language.  See Paul Killebrew, Where Are All the Left Wing Textualists? 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1897 (2007); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods:  A 
Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 773 (2008) (both 
presenting modern views regarding the ongoing debate between textualism and 
intentionalism). 
 106. Courts usually adopt the scope test because of its simplicity and predictability.  See 
Cooper Tire, 474 F.3d at 280; Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1081 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
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B.  The Collateral Test 
In the three cases that provide the framework for the collateral test, 
labor unions sued their employers and sought arbitration of their 
disputes.107  In all three circuits, the courts held that the collateral test was 
the proper test to determine when to apply the CBA’s arbitration clause to a 
related side agreement. 
The collateral test examines the relatedness of the side agreement to a 
CBA.108  Specifically, the court evaluates how independent the side 
agreement is to the CBA.109  Side agreements that, while related, are 
independent enough to exist without the CBA are held to be collateral and 
insufficiently related to the source CBA for the CBA’s arbitration clause to 
be held applicable.110  Conversely, side agreements that are so extensively 
interrelated and entwined with the original CBA that they could not exist 
independently without the CBA are held to not be collateral.111  With non-
collateral agreements that are tremendously interconnected with the CBA, 
the courts have utilized the CBA’s arbitration clause in disputes over their 
related side agreements.112 
1.  The Fourth Circuit 
Nearly twenty years after the Third Circuit’s decision in Koven, the 
Fourth Circuit became the second court to rule on the issue of the 
applicability of a CBA’s arbitration clause to a related side agreement.  In 
Adkins v. Time World Co.,113 the Fourth Circuit laid the foundation for 
what would eventually come to be known as the collateral 
Adkins was the named plaintiff in a group of journeyman printers who 
brought an action against Times World, the Roanoke Typographical Union, 
and the International Typographical Union.114  In 1975, Times World and 
the unions negotiated a CBA.115  Due to fears stemming from the 
increasing automation of the printing process, the union and Times World 
 107. See, e.g., Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 788-89; Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 
2300, United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 
1991); Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1985) (all holding that 
the collateral test should be used to analyze the applicability of a CBA’s arbitration clause to 
a related side agreement). 
 108. Cornell Univ., 942 F.2d at 140. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 771 F.2d at 832. 
 114. Id. at 829-30. 
 115. Id. at 830. 
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entered into a side agreement, which contained provisions guaranteeing 
lifetime employment to certain printers.116  In the 1980s, Times World fell 
on hard times and reduced its staff.  Adkins was one of the printers 
terminated despite the protection afforded under the side agr 117
Unlike many of the later scope test decisions, which acknowledge the 
existence of the conflicting points of view in this area, Adkins does not 
even mention the scope test.  Whereas a court utilizing the scope test would 
examine the breadth of the CBA’s arbitration clause and then determine 
whether or not this side agreement would fall under the arbitration clause, 
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis follows a decidedly different direction. 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis turns on whether or not the side 
agreement could be considered a part of the CBA.118  In instances where a 
clear connection between the two exists, the courts can hold that the side 
agreement is not actually a separate side agreement at all, but instead a part 
of the main CBA, and thereby subject to the arbitration clause.119  
However, if the side agreement appears to be too separate from or too far 
removed from the CBA, then courts may rule that the arbitration clause is 
inapplicable.120  The Fourth Circuit listed several factors that should be 
considered in determining whether a side agreement is collateral:  the 
language of the side agreement, the negotiation process, and the parties’ 
understanding of the documents—emphasizing the parties’ understanding 
of the documents as two separate agreements or a single agreement.121 
While short in length and somewhat vague regarding the key 
determinative factors, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Adkins lays the 
groundwork for the collateral test, which is further developed by the 
Second and Eighth Circuits. 
2.  The Second Circuit 
In 1991, the Second Circuit adopted the collateral test in Cornell 
University v. UAW Local 2300.122  Cornell University is notable because it 
is one of the first cases that explicitly used the term “collateral.”123  The 
rationale in Cornell University built upon the groundwork laid by the 
Fourth Circuit in Adkins and differentiated between the scope and collateral 
tests more clearly. 
 116. The side agreement guaranteed the employment of certain workers to a retirement 
age set by the union.  Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 831-32. 
 119. Adkins, 771 F.2d at 831-32 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 831. 
 122. Cornell, 942 F.2d at 138. 
 123. Id. at 140. 
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The Local 2300 Union represented a segment of employees at Cornell 
University.124  In 1988, the union and the University entered into a four-
year CBA, which contained a broad arbitration clause.125  The arbitration 
clause stated that “any matter involving the interpretation or application of 
this Agreement which alleges a violation of the rights of an employee or 
the Union under the terms of this Agreement” was an arbitrable 
grievance.126 
One of the most contentious issues between the union and the 
University was the burgeoning cost of health care.127  The union 
incorporated several of its healthcare proposals into a letter, which 
eventually became the side agreement at issue in the case.128  When the 
University attempted to take an action contrary to the terms of the letter, 
the union sought redress through the procedures outlined in the arbitration 
clause of the CBA.129 
The union attempted to sway the Court to employ the scope test by 
drawing the Court’s attention to Warrior, the case most often cited in 
support of the scope test.130  Given the broad applicability of the arbitration 
clause at question in this case, it seems likely that the Court would have 
found the arbitration clause to be applicable had the scope test been 
utilized.  However, the Court ultimately ruled against the union and 
adopted the collateral test, as first seen in Adkins.131 
Previously in Pitta v. Hotel Ass’n of New York City, Inc.,132 the 
Second Circuit held that a contract that lacked an arbitration clause, but 
was meant to serve as a supplement to a contract with an arbitration clause, 
could utilize the latter contract’s arbitration clause.  Following this 
precedent, the Court argued that it should extend the Pitta reasoning to 
include cases where the contract is collateral, not just cases where the 
contract is supplementary.133  Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit 
 124. Id. at 139. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Cornell, 942 F.2d at 138. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 140. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Pitta v. Hotel Ass’n of New York City, Inc., 806 F.2d 419, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 133. The Second Circuit provided an interesting analysis in order to reach its use of the 
collateral test, essentially arguing that it had already effectively been using the collateral test 
for some time prior to the Cornell decision without calling it as much.  The Court cited 
several prior Second Circuit cases as controlling on this issue, making them the building 
blocks of what would be dubbed the “collateral test.”  See Pitta v. Hotel Ass’n of New York 
City, Inc., 806 F.2d 419, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1986); Associated Brick Mason Contractors of 
Greater New York, Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1987).  Cornell, therefore, 
appears to be better understood as the first instance in which the Second Circuit placed all of 
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provided no clear guidelines for determining whether to deem a contract 
collateral, and instead relied on a facial judgment of the side agre 134
3.  The Eighth Circuit 
In 2005, the Eighth Circuit in United Steelworkers of America v. 
Duluth Clinic, Ltd. became the most recent circuit to adopt the collateral 
test.135  The Eighth Circuit’s adoption of the collateral test is important 
because the Court’s opinion is the most well-rounded and highly informed 
opinion to embrace the principle.  While not as thoroughly reasoned as the 
later scope test decisions, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in this case presents 
the most in-depth argument in favor of the application of the collateral test. 
In early 2000, the union and the Clinic entered into a series of five 
CBAs covering various aspects of employee benefits.136  Under a separate 
letter, the parties drafted an agreement that outlined the payment of various 
types of health benefits to retired employees and their spouses.137  Almost 
as soon as the benefits were enacted, the Clinic eliminated the retiree 
benefits because, upon further inspection, it was discovered that the 
program did not comply with Medicare law.138  After a year of debate, the 
parties reached an impasse, with the Union eventually attempting to file an 
unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board.139  
When the Clinic denied that there was a grievance under the CBA, the 
Union sought to compel arbitration of the side agreement under the terms 
of the CBA’s arbitration clause.140 
At the Union’s urging, the Eighth Circuit began its analysis by looking 
at the then-recently decided Dutra case from the Ninth Circuit.141  After 
little consideration, the Court rejected the scope test and utilized the 
Second Circuit’s approach.142  However, the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is 
bizarre, as it makes no attempt to rationalize the choice between the two 
tests. 
What makes the Court’s opinion even stranger is that, barely a 
its prior precedent together to create a cognizable set of case law and precedent regarding 
this issue.  Unlike the Fourth Circuit before it, the Second Circuit provided no clear 
guidelines for determining whether to deem a contract collateral, and instead relied on a 
facial judgment of the side agreement. 
 134. Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement 
Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 135. United Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 136. Id. at 787. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 788. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 413 F.3d at 788.  
 142. Id. 
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paragraph after rejecting the scope test, the Court launches into an analysis 
that strongly resembles it.143  The Court announces that it will first decide 
whether the arbitration clause is broadly or narrowly written, which, given 
the Dutra precedent, should not be the primary concern of a Court utilizing 
the collateral test.144  After taking a narrow view of the arbitration clause, 
the Court then examines the issue of whether or not the side agreement is 
collateral to the CBA.145  In turn, the Eighth Circuit completely adopts the 
Second Circuit’s approach.146  The Court does not adopt the Fourth 
Circuit’s factor-based approach and instead merely evaluates whether the 
side agreement “may be read as part and parcel of the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement or whether it is collateral to it.”147 
The Eighth Circuit seems to envision the collateral test as being a 
second prong for the scope test.  Unlike the Fourth and Second Circuits, 
which place a priority on determining whether or not an agreement is 
collateral, the Eighth Circuit puts a great deal of emphasis on determining 
the scope of the CBA’s arbitration clause.148  While claiming to adhere to 
the collateral test, the Eighth Circuit has instead embraced a modified form 
of the collateral test with some of the principles of the scope test. 
4.  The Effect of the Collateral Test 
If the scope test is the textualist’s answer to the side agreement 
dilemma, then the collateral test is the intentionalist’s answer.  The 
collateral test is much more respectful of the parties’ intent.  It can, 
however, be difficult to apply, thus making its results somewhat difficult to 
predict.  Overall, the collateral test offers a strong alternative to the scope 
test. 
One of the benefits of the collateral test is that it takes into account 
many more factors than the scope test.  As illustrated by the Fourth Circuit 
in Adkins, a court utilizing the collateral test can look to factors such as the 
parties’ understanding and the negotiation process.  This is in stark contrast 
to the scope test, which focuses primarily on the breadth of the arbitration 
clause. 
The collateral test’s focus on the parties’ intent yields what can be 
seen as a more fair result than the scope test.  From a normative standpoint, 
it is much more equitable to apply the arbitration clause only to issues that 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 789. 
 145. Id. at 790. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d at 790 (quoting Cornell Univ. v. UAW Local 2300, 
United Auto. Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers, 942 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 148. Id. at 788. 
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the parties intended it to be applied to.  If the parties’ intent can be 
discovered from the myriad factors available for the court to analyze, then 
it would seem proper for the court to respect the parties’ wishes and only 
apply the arbitration clause in circumstances where it was meant to be 
applied. 
The major drawback of the collateral test comes from the divination of 
the parties’ intent.  The same problems that plague intentionalism plague 
the collateral test.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to always reliably 
determine the parties’ intent.  CBAs are massive documents created by 
dozens of people, representing many different, and sometimes conflicting, 
interests.  The idea that a court can reliably look at the CBA and determine 
the parties’ intent, no matter how many factors they examine, can come 
across as disingenuous.  Not every case is as simplistic as Adkins where the 
title of the side agreement clearly indicated that the parties intended the 
side agreement to be considered part of the CBA.149  From the standpoint of 
judicial efficiency, one can argue that, at the very least, the collateral test 
will cause substantially more litigation on the aforementioned issues than 
the scope test. 
The collateral test, much like the scope test, is not a perfect solution to 
the issue of the arbitration of side agreements to CBAs.  In situations where 
the collateral test works, it works well.  It certainly seems preferable to 
respect the intentions of the parties and abide by their own interpretation of 
their documents.  Such agreement, however, is unlikely, and it seems 
improbable that intent can be easily or reliably determined in all of the 
cases that would present this issue.  Overall, while preferable in theory, the 
collateral test in practice has major flaws. 
III.  DETERMINING WHEN A CBA’S ARBITRATION CLAUSE SHOULD BE 
APPLIED TO A RELATED SIDE AGREEMENT 
Part of what makes the analysis of this circuit split so challenging is 
that it involves cases that are nearly forty years old.  Not only are many of 
the cases dated, but there is also a large gap between when each of the 
circuits rendered their decisions on the issue.150  As times change, the 
environments in which decisions are made change as well. 
This topic would, seemingly, be a strong candidate for review by the 
Supreme Court.  It involves a major issue that affects millions of 
 149. The side agreement to the CBA had the word “addendum” in the title.  Adkins, 771 
F.2d at 830. 
 150. Such as the almost twenty year gap between Adkins and Koven.  See United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007); United 
Steelworkers v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 413 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2005); Inlandboatmens Union of 
Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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Americans,151 and it has left a split among the circuits, as they are almost 
evenly divided between the two tests, with four favoring the scope test and 
three favoring the collateral test.  However, it seems highly unlikely that 
the Court would be willing to grant certiorari on this issue, because there 
has not been a strong push for it.  Furthermore, even though the circuit split 
has existed for over twenty years, only one of the aforementioned cases-
Adkins152—actually applied for certiorari,153 though the petition was denied 
by the Supreme Court.154  This phenomenon could exist for any number of 
reasons, but it appears to indicate that there is a lack of interest in litigating 
this issue at the Supreme Court. 
Another important factor indicating unlikelihood that the Supreme 
Court would grant certiorari is that despite its broad effects, this is a highly 
technical issue that deals with a very specialized area of the law.  The Court 
has already indicated in the Steelworkers Trilogy and in Warrior that it 
would prefer to pass collective bargaining disputes to arbitrators.155  The 
Court justified this by arguing that arbitration would lead to increased 
industrial stability.156  As noted above, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
its stance on arbitration on multiple occasions.157  Furthermore, given the 
low number of cases to which the Court grants certiorari, it seems unlikely 
that the Court would grant it here because of the implications of upsetting 
industrial stability by ruling on this issue.  Even when framed as an issue of 
intentionalism versus textualism, it is not clear how the Court would rule.  
This author’s prediction is that given the Court’s current composition, the 
justices would likely rule in favor of the textualist-based solution found in 
the scope test. 
Is the scope test, however, the decision that the Court should actually 
reach?  Both tests present excellent solutions to the problem, yet both have 
distinctive strengths and weaknesses. 
One can argue that the collateral test is superior to the scope test 
because it better addresses the parties’ intent.  By analyzing factors, 
including the negotiation process and the parties’ subjective belief of 
whether the side agreement was to be covered by the CBA’s arbitration 
clause, the collateral test, if it can genuinely and accurately be applied in a 
majority of real world settings, provides the best chance of assuring a result 
 151. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that over 15.7 million Americans are 
members of unions.  Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members In 2007 
(Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author). 
 152. Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 829 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 153. Adkins v. Time-World Corp., 474 U.S. 1109, 1109 (1986). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599; Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 
U.S. at 578. 
 156. Warrior, 363 U.S. at 578. 
 157. See supra Part II (discussing the cases that utilize the scope test). 
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that is most in tune with the parties’ original hopes for the contract. 
Nonetheless, the collateral test’s drawbacks ultimately make the scope 
test superior.  The collateral test is unable to function in situations where 
the intent of the parties is unclear or non-existent.  Modern labor 
negotiations are amazingly complex, with many parties arguing over 
numerous issues.  The existence of these contentious side agreements 
displays the difficulty inherent in modern labor negotiations.  If labor 
negotiations were simple, then there would be no need to amend the 
negotiations later with the related side agreements that have perplexed the 
circuit courts. 
Admittedly, there are some cases that appear to suggest that a court 
should be able to reasonably determine the intent of the parties.  In Adkins, 
for example, the title given to the related side agreement made it clear that 
the parties intended for the side agreement to be considered part of the 
main CBA, rather than as a distinct agreement.158  The Second, Fourth, and 
Eighth Circuits, however, seem to be under the impression that cases like 
Adkins will be the norm.  I would argue that, instead, Adkins and its 
progenies are outliers and do not represent what a court should reasonably 
expect to encounter when examining side agreements.  In analogizing to 
criminal law, there will always be certain cases where the perpetrator is 
caught red-handed with a smoking gun.  However, for every obvious case, 
there are other cases that are infinitely more complex. 
Similarly, there will always be cases like Adkins where a court 
immediately determines the parties’ intent.  But, given the complexity of 
the negotiations involved, it is naïve to expect that a court will be able to 
magically interpret the parties’ intentions in every case.  The collateral test 
does nothing to prepare a court to deal with cases where the intent of the 
parties is unclear. 
The scope test is superior because it counters this failing.  Rather than 
search for intent by examining the parties’ conduct, its textualism-focused 
analysis infers intent only through examination of the finalized CBA.  The 
scope test does not rely on judgments from obtuse incentives that may have 
motivated the parties when creating the initial agreements.  By only 
looking at the scope of the CBA’s arbitration clause, the scope test prevents 
itself from falling subject to the inherent unreliability of the collateral test.  
Whereas the collateral test fails in situations where the parties’ intent is 
unclear or cannot be divined through a thorough examination of all 
available evidence, the scope test prevails. 
The scope test is also much easier to utilize.  Contracting parties 
should be able to easily look to the scope of their arbitration clauses and 
determine if subsequent agreements will fall subject to arbitration.  If the 
 158. Adkins, 771 F.2d at 829. 
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parties wish to prevent arbitration in later agreements, they need only 
narrow the arbitration clause or state that the arbitration clause is not 
applicable in the side agreement.  For both courts and potential litigants, 
the scope test presents a much simpler analysis.  Rather than focusing on 
the complexities of analyzing an entire collective bargaining situation, the 
courts can address a single provision, and in turn, learn virtually all the 
information necessary to render an informed decision. 
Returning to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dutra, the ease of use 
provided by the scope test will create much greater industrial stability than 
the collateral test.159  If both parties to a contract and the courts can easily 
determine the situations in which it is appropriate to extend arbitration 
clause coverage, then the stability the Supreme Court aimed to create in 
Warrior and the Steelworkers Trilogy will come to fruition.160  The 
collateral test is simply too complex to produce stability, which is valued 
not only in labor law, but in all of American jurisprudence. 
 CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court may never address the issue of when to extend 
arbitration clause coverage to side agreements to CBAs.  As the 
international economy grows, labor disputes are inevitable.  In the past ten 
years, the circuits have begun to decide these cases in a much quicker 
succession than one would have anticipated, given the long spans of time 
between the earliest cases involved.161  It seems a foregone conclusion that 
the remaining circuits will undoubtedly have to determine which of these 
tests presents the best way to settle future collective bargaining disputes.  It 
is the opinion of this author that the remaining circuits, and the Supreme 
Court itself, should follow the scope test asserted by the Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  While the collateral test presents a viable 
solution to this problem, the scope test, for all of the aforementioned 
reasons, is a far superior approach. 
 
 159. Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 160. See also United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) 
(discussing the stabilizing influence of arbitration when it addresses all disputes under an 
agreement). 
 161. There was a nearly twenty-year gap between Koven and its nearest successor 
Adkins. 
